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 1 
GENDER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST REFUGEES 
 
I. Introduction: 
 
In 1951, the United Nations established a multilateral treaty known as the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which set out certain basic guidelines 
on the eligibility of individuals claiming refugee status, rules relating to the process of 
granting asylum, rights of refugees and the obligations of nations granting asylum 
(hereinafter referred to as the 1951 Convention).1 The 1951 Convention further builds 
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR), which codifies 
customary international law and recognizes the right of all persons to seek asylum 
from persecution in other countries. Article 7 of the UDHR also states that everyone is 
entitled to its rights and freedoms without discrimination of any kind, including gender 
discrimination.2 The UDHR also ensures that men and women have equal rights in 
marriage, and that everyone has the right to own property, the right to work and free 
choice of employment, and the right to education. 
 
However, there is still criticism of international law today because despite the 
apparent neutrality of the law and its and interpretations, women are still discriminated 
against, stereotyped and unfairly disadvantaged. For example, the 1951 Convention 
does not recognize gender as a ground of persecution under which individuals can 
claim refugee status. Although women suffer similar forms of persecution like men,                                                         
1 United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 189, p. 137 
2 Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, UNHCR Policy on Refugee Women and 
Guidelines on Their Protection: An Assessment of Ten Years of Implementation, May 2002 
 2 
e.g. torture, unlawful detention etc., in addition, there are other forms of gender related 
persecution such as sexual assault and rape that are unique to women simply because 
they are women.3 In order to better understand this problem, it is important to note that 
the term ‘gender’ is often erroneously used synonymously with the term ‘sex’ – which 
is biologically defined, while gender refers to the social organization of sexual 
difference or rather, the construction of power relations between women and men.4 
Gender differences and relations change with the historic, cultural and geographic 
context of the situation – meaning that the experience of being a man or a woman 
changes with time and place. The UNHRC has also further clarified that gender is not 
static or innate but acquires socially and culturally constructed meaning over time. 
Gender related claims therefore, may be brought by either men or women - although 
due to particular types of persecution, they are more commonly brought by women.5 
Thus, if the goal of the international community is to create fair and effective refugee 
laws which apply equally to all human beings - it becomes extremely important to 
understand the specific way in which gender (versus just sex, which is biological) 
influences the life and circumstances of a refugee.6 
 
For this reason, many jurists argue that Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention 
should be extended to include women suffering from gender specific persecution such                                                         
3 Eva Nilsson, Persecution on Account of One's Gender: Refugee Status or Status Quo?, 
feminists@law Journal, University of Kent, Vol 2, No.1 (2012), p.16, available online at: 
http://journals.kent.ac.uk/index.php/feministsatlaw/article/view/56 
4 Refugee Womenı́s Legal Group, Gender Guidelines for the Determination of Asylum Claims in the 
UK, July 1998, at p. 8 
5 UNHCR Guidelines for Prevention and Response, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence against 
Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, May 2003, pp. 109-111, available online at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/3f696bcc4.pdf 
6 Ibid. 
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as human trafficking, rape and other sexual assaults, unique to her social and 
geographic context. According to Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the term 
‘Refugee’ applies to any person who: “owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for the reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside his country of origin and is unable or 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the county of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it.” 7 
 
This definition establishes five grounds of persecution – race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or on the basis of holding a 
political opinion. Even though women and children form over 80% of the total number 
of displaced persons in the world, it is still the case that in the determination process, 
male applicants seeking asylum are significantly more successful in obtaining refugee 
status.8 While there is nothing explicit that precludes women from being recognized as 
refugees, the way member states have interpreted these instruments still reinforces and 
reflects gender biases. The standard adopted by the law, though it may prima facie 
appear to be entirely gender neutral, continues to disadvantage women by not taking                                                         
7 Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Reissued in Geneva, 
December 2011, at p. 46, available online at: http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/publications/legal/3d58e13b4/handbook-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-status-under-
1951-convention.html 
8 Eileen Pittaway & Linda Bartolomei, Refugees, Race, and Gender: The Multiple Discrimination 
against Refugee Women, Canada’s Journal on Refugees, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2015), pp. 21 – 22, 
available online at: http://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/view/40316/36358 
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into account their special circumstances. I have analyzed below some of the significant 
ways in which the application of the 1951 Convention unfairly affects women, and 
how member states have attempted to remedy this situation through interpretation and 
domestic legislation.  
 
II. Differences in Persecution 
 
Public forms of persecution, like civil and political harms, are more likely to 
affect men, and have therefore historically been the primary focus of refugee 
protections, and of human rights more broadly. Harms that are more likely to occur in 
the private sphere – like gender specific violence, rape, sexual assault and human 
trafficking are much more likely to affect women and have therefore been excluded 
from the realm of violations that earn an individual refugee status. 9  Further, the 
traditional view of a refugee is that of a male activist, persecuted or displaced as a 
result of his political actions against the State.10 While the 1951 Convention was not 
necessarily drafted with the intention of distinguishing between male and female 
refugees, even in practice, it has failed to address these forms of persecution that are 
gender specific. 
 
Given this background, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR)’s Executive Committee encouraged member states party to                                                         
9 Martina Pomeroy, Left  Out in the Cold: Tracking Victims, Gender, and Misinterpretation of the 
Refugee Convention's "Nexus" Requirement, 16 Mich. J. Gender & L. 453 (2010), available online 
at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mjgl/vol16/iss2/3 
10 Ibid. 
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the 1951 Convention to adopt guidelines recognizing claims by women who faced 
private discrimination on the basis of gender:  “In accordance with the principle that 
women’s rights are human rights, these guidelines should recognize as refugees, 
women whose claim to refugee status is based upon well-founded fear of persecution 
for reasons enumerated in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, including 
persecution through sexual violence or other gender-related persecution.” 11 It has 
been argued that the current framework fails to protect women who need specialized 
protection from types of harms that are particular to their gender - including but not 
limited to rape, sexual assault, dowry related bride burning, female genital mutilation, 
forced marriage, domestic violence, forced abortion, female infanticide etc. 12 
Additionally, in many countries today, women are also not adequately protected from 
the harms of living in a male dominated society, in which many of their fundamental 
rights have been denied to them.13 
 
Many international law jurists have argued that women suffer particular forms 
of oppression solely because they are women, completely independent from their 
political opinion or ethnicity. The situation today in many middle-eastern countries 
like Syria reflects this reality. Given that the 1951 Convention does not attempt to 
bring this type of persecution within its ambit is evidence that it was developed from a 
male paradigm since it more accurately reflects male applicant’s factual situation. As a                                                         
11 U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Executive Comm., General Conclusion on International 
Protection, No. 77 (XLVI) (October, 1995), available online at: http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/excom/exconc/3ae68c438/general-conclusion-international-protection.html 
12 Nancy Kelly, Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims, Int J. of Refugee Law, Oxford University 
Press (1994), Vol. 6, pp. 517-534 
13 Ibid. 
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response to this criticism, the UNHCR has recommended that member states develop 
specialized procedures for the determination of women’s refugee status, and that 
asylum-seekers who may have suffered sexual violence be treated with particular 
sensitivity, recognizing that women refugees often experience persecution differently 
than men.14 
 
Rape and other forms of sexual violence which women are subject to can often 
be motivated by political reasons – and has occurred in parallel with genocide in many 
areas of armed conflict. For example, the ‘ethnic cleaning’ carried out in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia, where specific forms of violence were used against women 
as a means of interrogation.15 Government officers or opposition militants could also 
commit these crimes against civilian women as part of a larger strategy to terrorize the 
population. Thus, in these situations the harm itself may have been intended for the 
males in the community through raping or sexually assaulting their women, but the 
injuries are internalized by women victims because they are required to bear the 
physical consequences in addition to dealing with the social stigma that usually 
follows these types of crimes.16 However, women detained for non-political reasons 
are also just as frequently subject to rape or sexual assault – and when it is state actors 
who are carrying out these acts, it seems appropriate that this would rise to the level of 
persecution against women, under which they should be able to claim refugee status.  
                                                         
14 UNHCR Guidelines for Prevention and Response, Supra n. 5, pp. 109-111 
15 Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International law, Symposium on the 
Yugoslav Crisis: New International Law Issues, European J. of Int. Law, Vol.5 (1994) p. 329,  
available online at: http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/5/1/1246.pdf 
16 Ibid. 
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III. Women as a ‘Social Group’ 
 
In 1986, five Iranian nationals, one of whom was a woman, sought political 
asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the woman claimed that she was 
subject to special reprisals because of her sex. The Federal Office granted the 
applicants asylum because of their well-founded fear of persecution due to their 
political activities.17 In addition, the woman was found to have belonged to a specific 
social group of Iranian women, who were subject to persecution specific to that group. 
The Office held that “the ideologically based power of men over women, results in a 
general political repression of women and children in defiance of their individual 
liberties and human rights.”18 In a similar case in the United Kingdom, the court 
denied asylum based on the ‘social group’ category even though it recognized that 
women and children could be protected under it. The way the court applied the law 
clearly indicates the problem of protecting persecuted women as a social group rather 
than recognizing gender as a basis of persecution. In this case, an Iranian woman 
sought asylum in the UK based on the basis of her position as a woman in Iran. Her 
application was denied. One of the conclusions of the Appeal Tribunal was that the 
‘social group’ provision means membership in a group that can be identified and has 
                                                        
17 A. Johnsson, The International Protection of Women Refugees: A Summary of Principal Problems 
and Issues, Int J Refugee Law, Vol. 1 (1989), p. 221-232 
18 Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, UNHCR Policy on Refugee Women and 
Guidelines on Their Protection: An Assessment of Ten Years of Implementation, May 2002, 
available online at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/48aa83220.pdf 
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common practices or beliefs, but that there was no evidence that Iranian women and 
children considered themselves a social group separate from other Iranians.19 
 
The United States courts have agreed with such a narrow reading of the term 
and have likewise made it difficult for women to rely on this category to flee gender 
based persecution. The Ninth Circuit has developed a test for what constitutes a social 
group in the decision Sanchez-Turijillo v. INS,20 where the court stated: “The phrase 
‘particular social group’ implies a collection of people closely affiliated with each 
other, who are actuated by some common impulse or interest.   Of central concern is 
the existence of a voluntary associational relationship among the purported members, 
which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a 
member of that discrete social group.” Further, the court also observed that such an 
all-encompassing grouping as the petitioners were trying to fit themselves into was not 
the type of cohesive, homogeneous group, which would come under the term 
‘particular social group’. 
 
The Second Circuit subsequently relied on this definition to deny a Salvadorian 
woman refugee status.   In Gomez v. INS,21 a woman sought asylum because she had 
been repeatedly battered and raped by Salvadorian guerrillas. She claimed that because 
of these attacks she became a member of a social group singled out for persecution in 
El Salvador. However, the court held that she failed to produce evidence that women                                                         
19 ZH (Women as Particular Social Group) Iran CG, [2003] UKIAT 00207, available online at: 
http://tribunalsdecisions.service.gov.uk/utiac/38547 
20 Sanchez-Trujillo, et al., v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986)   
21 Gomez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 947 F.2d 660 (2nd Cir. 1991) 
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who have previously been abused by the guerrillas possess certain common 
characteristics other than gender and youth, such that persecutors could identify them 
as members of the purported group. In other cases however, US courts have granted 
political asylum to male refugees who claimed persecution in their countries on the 
basis of sexual orientation. Since the state was unable to protect its citizens from abuse 
and rape which they were subjected to as a result of their sexual orientation, courts 
found that refugees in these cases possessed a well-founded fear of persecution 
because there has been culture of severe discrimination against homosexuals that 
existed in their home countries. Thus, because homosexuals were the victims of 
targeted violence on account of their sexual orientation, they were recognized as a 
‘social group’ and received asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 1965 
(INA).22 
 
Under the UNHCR guidelines, the category of ‘membership of a particular 
social group’ cannot be interpreted as to render the other Convention grounds 
superfluous or as a catchall provision applying to all persons fearing persecution. 
According to the guidelines, a social group cannot be defined exclusively by the fact 
that it is targeted for persecution.23 There is also no closed list of what groups may 
constitute a particular social group. Rather, the phrase ‘membership of a particular 
social group’ should be read in an evolutionary manner, open to the diverse and 
                                                        
22  Bromsfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) 
23 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, Membership of a particular social group within 
the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees, May, 2002 
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changing nature of groups in various societies and evolving norms of international 
humanitarian law.24 
 
As an alternative to obtaining refugee status as a social group, persecuted 
women could try to seek protection under the political opinion or religion category – 
which has been discussed below. However in this context, it is important to note that a 
woman's refusal to abide by the traditions of her country is often not based on any 
political opinion or religious belief she may hold.   Rather, it is may be based on her 
personal distaste for that particular tradition, for which the State may punish her 
without any consequences under International law.25 
 
Now however, the international community is beginning to recognize the need 
for broadening the definition of refugee to include those fleeing gender-based 
persecution.   In April 1984, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, which 
called on states to recognize the right of women in certain countries who face harsh or 
inhuman treatment because they are considered to have transgressed the social norms 
of the country in which they live to be considered a “social group” within the meaning 
of the 1951 Convention.26 
 
The inconsistent use of the social group category by member countries, as 
indicated by these cases, is the result of the UNHCR’s failure to define it in precise                                                         
24 Ibid. 
25 P. Tuitt, False Images: Law's Construction of the Refugee (Pluto Press, 1996), 24-45;  
S. Kneebone, Moving Beyond the State: Refugees, Accountability and Protection, The Refugee 
Convention 50 Years On: Globalization and International Law (2003), p. 279-311 
26  UNHCR Guidelines for Prevention and Response, Supra n. 5, at p. 109 
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terms. Judges and practitioners who attempt to define or apply it consider factors such 
as ethnic, cultural, and linguistic origin, education, family background, economic 
activity, shared values, outlook, and aspirations. Another important factor they take 
into account is the attitude of the State toward the purported social group and how they 
have been disadvantaged as a result of failing to receive state protection.27 However, 
in the countries discussed above, women and children do not seem to be perceived of 
by their governments or the rest of society as a distinct cohesive group with common 
beliefs and practices – which could explain why they are not automatically recognized 
as a separate social group under the 1951 Convention. 
 
IV. ‘Political Opinion’ in the context of Gender Specific Crimes 
 
However, although gender-related persecution like rape and other sexual 
assault are being accepted as a valid ground for persecution in Canada and the US, 
women victims of these crimes still face difficulties in producing the appropriate 
evidence, as they are also required to prove that there was a failure of the state to 
adequately protect them.28 The biggest challenge faced by women in this regard is that 
claims of rape, sexual assault or other gendered crimes can only be made on at least 
one of the five grounds of the Convention. Currently, the two most frequently used 
grounds are the ‘social group’ category and ‘political opinion.’ 29 
 
                                                        
27 Supra n. 8, at p. 23 
28 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, 1st ed. 2005, at p. 421 
29 Ibid. 
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Although cases in the United States have laid down a rather broad definition of 
political opinion, women still face significant difficulty in bringing their claims under 
this ground because they are usually not directly involved in political activities. 30 
Courts have held that women have the burden of showing the nexus between their 
political opinion and the fear of gender-related persecution, and also that the state is 
unable or unwilling to protect them.31 As a result, women are still less successful since 
most rape and sexual violence have no connection to their political opinion, and many 
of those who suffer such persecution are not publicly involved in politics.32 Generally, 
while women are less likely than men to be involved in high profile political activities, 
it has been found that they are more often integral in carrying out ‘low level’ political 
activities that comprise of private activities like - providing food, clothing, medical 
care, pass messages from political activists or hiding people.33 This is because in some 
societies, overt demonstrations of political opinion by women may not be permissible, 
as women are not even allowed to formally participate in the political life of the 
community.  
 
                                                        
30 As seen in the case of Sofia Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, (5th Cir. 1987), where a 
woman was asserting that: (i) she was persecuted in El Salvador for political opinions attributed to 
her by her assailants on account of her family membership; and (ii) that she would be subject to 
future persecution if deported back to El Salvador. The Court in this case held that these threats of 
reprisal were personally motivated, and that there was no indication that the perpetrator maintained 
an interest in her because of her political opinion. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Heaven Crawley & Trine Lester, Comparative analysis of gender-related persecution in national 
asylum legislation and practice in Europe, UNHCR’s Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, May 
2004, at p. 68, available online at: http://www.unhcr.org/40c071354.pdf 
33 Ibid. 
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Because of this reason, it has been argued that a woman’s challenge of the 
particular social conventions that govern her, and her being sexually assaulted as a 
result should be considered persecution on the basis of her ‘political opinion.’ 34 
Further, questions regarding whether a woman is free to wear a veil or not, to be 
subject to genital mutilation, to exercise her right to education, or to be free from male 
violence are essentially about demarcating private rights from the public sphere. Any 
conflicts concerning these private rights are acts of political resistance, and that is how 
they should be considered when evaluating women’s claims for refugee status. 35 
Some courts have applied this broad definition with more success, like the Fifth 
Circuit, in Coriolan v. INS, overruled the opinion of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA), which held that people without overt political activity are unlikely to be victims 
of persecution. The court further held that “citizens can be the focus of government 
persecution without ever taking any conventionally political action at all.”36 
 
In another case, the Ninth Circuit held that a perpetrator of sexual assault had 
imputed political opinion onto his victim, Ms. Lazo-Majano. He believed that because 
she was a woman - she belonged to a class of persons that he could dominate or 
suppress. The perpetrator warned the victim that since he was an army officer, no 
authorities would get involved, and that he could legally have her tortured and killed if 
she attempted to seek protection from the State. Therefore, her resistance against these 
crimes was considered to be a political act based on the opinion that women are to be                                                         
34 Maureen Mulligan, Obtaining Political Asylum: Classifying Rape as a Well-Founded Fear of 
Persecution on Account of Political Opinion, 10 B.C. Third World L.J. 355 (1990), pp. 374-376 
available online at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/vol10/iss2/6 
35 Supra n. 32, at p. 74 
36 Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977), at p. 1001 
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treated equally and with basic dignity.37 However, since this case directly contradicts 
the Fifth Circuit case of Sofia Campos-Guardado v. INS, there is currently a conflict 
among the Circuit Courts as to whether rape creates a well-founded fear of persecution 
on account of political opinion.38 
 
V. Conclusion - The Move toward a Broader Definition?  
 
In 1995, the INS issued new guidelines (INS Guidelines) for evaluating 
women’s asylum claims based entirely or in part on their gender. These INS 
guidelines, which formally recognized gender-based persecution as a potential ground 
for asylum, expanded the definition of ‘refugee’ by including those fleeing gender-
based persecution.39 The INS guidelines state that the determination that sexual abuse 
may be serious enough to amount to persecution does not by itself make out a claim 
for asylum. 40  The applicant are still required to demonstrate that they have been 
persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one of the five 
protected grounds under the 1951 Convention.41 To establish persecution, it is required 
that the applicant prove that the harm was inflicted by government agents or 
alternatively, by a non-government entity that the state is unable or unwilling to 
control.42 As we seen from the cases above, many claims involving instances of rape                                                         
37 Olimpia Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1433 (9th Cir. 1987) 
38 Supra n. 34, at p. 357 
39 Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs, to Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Asylum Officers, Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum 
Claims from Women, May 1995, available online at: https://www.state.gov/s/l/65633.htm 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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or sexual abuse, tend to lack an identifiable state actor or group, which complicates 
this process for women refugees. 
 
The INS guidelines are an attempt to clarify the distinction between public and 
private acts. In a usual case, the government will be the alleged perpetrator of the 
crimes. But however, in cases against women – questions frequently arise regarding 
whether an act committed or threatened by a government official was nevertheless a 
purely private one.43 Such cases may also involve public officials who commit what is 
socially considered to be a private act. The guidelines provide that in these situations 
adjudicators are required to determine whether there is a reasonable basis for regarding 
the act in question as a ‘public’ act, which can then be attributed to the government or 
even to an agent that the government is unable or unwilling to control. Consequently, 
applicants must frame private acts such as rape or sexual abuse in the language of the 
public sphere.44 However, in some cases the persecutor may not be a government actor 
and in these cases, the burden is still on the petitioner to show that the state is unable 
or unwilling to protect its citizens from these kinds of harms.  
 
In the case of Klawitter v. INS, the Sixth Circuit denied political asylum to a 
Polish woman who had been blacklisted for refusing to join the Communist Party and 
was subsequently sexually assaulted by a colonel in the Polish secret police.45 The 
court held that the colonel’s actions were motivated by personal desire, rather than                                                         
43 Lucy Akinyi Orinda, Securing Gender-Based Persecution Claims: A Proposed Amendment to 
Asylum Law, 17 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 665 (2011), p. 677, available online at: 
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/vol17/ iss3/7 
44 Ibid.  
45 Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, (6th Cir. 1992) 
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from any interest on his part to persecute her.46 This decision highlights the distinction 
courts place between acts that are considered ‘public’ versus ‘private’, and also reveals 
the inconsistent nature of the outcomes of refugee claim cases.  In drawing these lines, 
acts found to be within the private sphere - such as sexual offenses are often not seen 
as persecution. It has been argued that such cases reflect the lack of a cohesive 
framework within which to evaluate the gender-related claims of women.47 Although 
each of the cases discussed above have raised either a claim based on ‘political 
opinion’ or a ‘social group’ argument, US courts have made disparate determinations 
of when persecution under either of these categories existed. 
 
Although the INS Guidelines have achieved a greater degree of protection for 
women refugees, there remains a lack of predictability in the adjudication of gender- 
based asylum claims. By specifically recognizing these harms as forms of persecution, 
adjudicators appear to no longer have the power to determine whether one act of rape 
is sufficient to qualify as ‘persecution’. 48  These decisions demonstrate that the 
standards employed to evaluate asylum claims have been applied inconsistently, and 
have thus created a system that lacks cohesion and predictability. In the context of 
gender-based persecution claims, the lack of guidance on what definitively constitutes 
“persecution” has left the term open to different levels of interpretation. It has been 
argued that the basis for success on any asylum claim is affected not only by which 
particular immigration judge the case has been assigned to, but also by various other                                                         
46 Ibid. 
47 Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women, Cornell Int’l 
Law Journal, Vol. 26 (1993), at p. 625 
48 Supra n. 43, at p. 686 
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factors like the gender and political views of the judge, past work experience etc.49 In 
conclusion, I think creating a more uniform system by removing the requirement of 
certain grave crimes committed in the personal sphere (like rape, sexual assault or 
female genital mutilation) from qualifying under one of the five categories from the 
1951 Convention might ensure more favorable treatment toward women refugees and 
prevent gender based discrimination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
49 Ibid, at. 682 
